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ABSTRACT 
We discuss Kochan’s recent criticism of the work of Joseph Rouse (Kochan 2011). 
We argue that Kochan fails to show that both Rouse’s own work and his Heidegger 
interpretation are plagued by insurmountable problems. We also try to locate the 
deeper, meta-philosophical reasons that are responsible for what we take to be 
Kochan’s misreading of Rouse’s work. This allows us to throw some light on the 
standoff that so often seems to characterize debates on scientific realism. 
                                                
1 This paper is the result of fully joint work. 
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The debate between realism and antirealism has been central in the general 
philosophy of science of the last decades. But ever since the heydays of the debate in 
the 1980s, there have been authors who have tried to argue for the overcoming or 
dissolution of the debate itself, by proposing a position that is neither realist nor 
antirealist. Prominent among these is Joseph Rouse (Rouse 1987). Yet, Jeff Kochan 
has recently argued that Rouse, despite his efforts to transcend the realism/antirealism 
debate through his universal practical hermeneutics, ends up an implicit realist 
(Kochan 2011). Kochan furthermore uses this as an occasion to rectify what he sees 
as Rouse’s influential but misleading interpretation of Heidegger. 
 In what follows we will take issue with Kochan’s diagnosis. We will show 
how passages from Rouse that Kochan interprets as signs of the former’s “confused 
realism” can be given a consistent, non-realist reading. We will expand a bit on this 
reading, taking clues from Rouse’s later work – which Kochan completely neglects. 
We aim to do more than merely criticize what we see as a misreading of Rouse’s 
work (including his interpretation of Heidegger), though. The main goal of our 
discussion will be to further clarify the far-reaching meta-philosophical choices made 
by thinkers such as Rouse, and which are overlooked in Kochan's analysis.  
 
1. Brute existence 
 
To illustrate the importance of meta-philosophical choices, let us begin by indicating 
the kind of implicit commitments that lie behind different possible interpretations of 
Heidegger. Kochan puts a lot of weight on the following passage from §43 from 
Division 1 of Sein und Zeit: 
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Of course only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an 
understanding of Being is ontically [i.e. factually] possible), ‘is there’ 
Being. When Dasein does not exist, ‘independence’ ‘is’ not either, nor 
‘is’ the ‘in-itself’. In such a case this sort of thing can be neither 
understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the-
world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot 
be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. But now, as 
long as there is an understanding of Being and therefore an 
understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be said that in this 
case entities will still continue to be. (Heidegger 1962, p. 255 [212], in 
Kochan 2011, p. 96) 
 
Kochan goes on: “Heidegger drives the point home by stating further that “Being (not 
entities) is dependent upon the understanding of Being; that is to say, Reality (not the 
Real) is dependent upon [Dasein]” (Kochan 2011, p. 96). Finally, he glosses this by 
stating that Heidegger “believes that entities have a brute existence independently of 
such understanding” (ibid.). Since on the contrary “what an entity is” does “depend on 
Dasein’s understanding”, Kochan describes Heidegger as a “minimal realist”, 
according to whom existence but not essence is completely independent of our 
interpretations (ibid.).  
 Kochan’s rephrasing of Heidegger’s statement is not at all innocent, however. 
All that Heidegger is literally saying is that some newly discovered (scientific) entity 
must be understood as having always already been there; this need not imply that we 
have to ascribe this to some property such as “brute existence”. In doing the latter, it 
is implicitly assumed that we need some kind of explanation for the fact that we can 
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understand the entity as having always already been there.2  
 We will not try to decide the vexed question which interpretation is the right 
reading of Heidegger when the full context of his work is taken into account. We 
merely want to point out that a (minimally) realist reading of Heidegger needs to do 
more than just cite these passages: it needs to make plausible that Heidegger was 
committed to the need for such, ultimately metaphysical, explanation. (Not only has 
Kochan failed to provide such independent evidence when providing his gloss, he has 
also taken over without comment Macquarrie and Robinson’s contentious 
capitalization of “Reality” and “the Real” in their translation of Sein und Zeit – which 
prejudges exactly this issue by suggesting that we are dealing with some specifically 
philosophical constructs.) 
 
 So this is the meta-philosophical issue at stake: do we require a further, 
specifically philosophical explanation for the success of our scientific ascriptions of 
existence to entities?3 It is to this question that Rouse unhesitatingly answers, in line 
with his understanding of Heidegger: no. 
 
2. Deflating existence 
 
To explicate his meta-philosophical commitment, Rouse introduces a useful analogy 
with a deflationary4 theory of truth (Rouse 1987, p. 160). To explicate the main idea 
                                                
2 Admittedly, our suggestion for this alternative line of interpretation is not more than a sketch that 
leaves open a great many questions. The basic idea is not foreign to the Heidegger literature, though 
(see, e.g., Blattner 2004). 
3 We call this issue “meta-philosophical” as it concerns the question what we should expect from our 
philosophical theories. 
4 Rouse actually talks about “redundancy” (1987, p. 156, p. 160). We will come back to this distinction 
between deflationary and redundant truth later (see infra, section 3). Although we are convinced that 
Rouse’s view only makes sense when read through the lens of a deflationary theory, his slightly 
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behind this analogy, let us first quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
lemma on such theories: “In [a] sense, the deflationary theory is not denying that truth 
is a property: truth is the property that all true propositions have. On the other hand, 
when we say that two things share a property F, we often mean more than simply that 
they are both F; we mean in addition that there is intuitively a common explanation as 
to why they are both F. It is in this second sense in which deflationists are denying 
that truth is a property.” (Stoljar and Damnjanovic, 2012). Similarly, Rouse wants us 
to stop presupposing that there is an explanatory property (“brute existence”) that all 
existing entities have in common, merely by their existing. 
 Rouse further works out the analogy through stating that “[j]ust as what is not 
a sentence in a language is not true-or-false, there is no fact of the matter about 
whether things that cannot intelligibly be encountered within a meaningful world exist 
or do not exist” (Rouse 1987, p. 160; quoted in Kochan 2011, p. 91 – notice the close 
relation with the Heidegger passage quoted above). This rules out once more the idea 
of “brute existence”, as it now turns out to be a meaningless concept, besides being 
“redundant” (Rouse 1987, p. 156). According to Kochan, this implies that since on 
Rouse’s account “nothing at all can exist (or not exist) unless it is meaningful [...] 
meaning and existence are somehow equivalent” (Kochan 2011, p. 91). Furthermore, 
this supposed “assimilation” (ibid.) of existence and meaning then renders Rouse's 
Heidegger interpretation untenable, as the latter explicitly warns against identifying 
an entity’s essence (what a thing is) with its existence (that it is) (ibid., pp. 97-8).  
But this cannot be quite right. Kochan understands Rouse as claiming that 
“existence counts as one such determination” along many other determinations that 
                                                                                                                                       
maladroit choice of terminology (as we will explain, it is only “brute existence” that is redundant, not 
“existence”) might well have triggered Kochan’s misreading exposed in this section.  
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jointly constitute the entity’s essence (ibid., p. 91). However, Rouse explicitly states 
that “‘existence’ is not a real property; it adds nothing to the determinations of the 
things said to exist” (Rouse 1987, p. 160). What has gone wrong?  
 We want to propose the following diagnosis. It is only Kochan’s assimilation 
of existence to “brute existence” – i.e., an explanatory property shared by all 
(existing) entities – that implies that existence is indeed a “determination” of these 
entities. This then induces the need to keep this determination explicitly separate from 
the entities’ other determinations, e.g., by claiming that contrary to the latter it in no 
way depends on our interpretation of them. Hence on this reading, Heidegger’s 
legitimate insistence on the distinction between essence and existence fits hand in 
glove with his presumed minimal realism. But as we saw, Rouse’s deflationary move 
is intended precisely to block the understanding of existence as “brute existence”. 
And this also allows him to accept that existence and essence are separate without this 
forcing him (or Heidegger) into a minimal realist position.  
 
3. Temporal existence 
 
Even if we have given a correct construal of Rouse’s explicit intentions, this will not 
do according to Kochan. He quotes a couple of passages from Rouse’s writings that 
supposedly show that his own language, notwithstanding his professed non-realism, 
actually betrays the necessity of introducing the brute existence of entities as an 
explanatory factor. Among the passages quoted are the following: 
 
[T]he possible ways a thing can be depends upon the configuration of 
practices within which they become manifest [...].  
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This configuration of practices [...] allows things to show themselves 
as they are in a variety of respects.  
(Rouse quoted in Kochan 2011, p. 93) 
 
Kochan comments that in these statements “‘thing’ refers to an entity whose ways of 
appearing are constrained by [... a] world [of meaning], but whose existence is not. 
The impression [...] is of an entity lurking somewhere behind the scenes, awaiting its 
cue to leap out onto the world stage. Manifestation thus seems to presuppose 
existence” (Kochan 2011, p. 93). According to Kochan, Rouse’s talk of manifestation 
thus invites a vertical reading, on which “ordinary norms of intelligibility” (ibid., p. 
110) force us to accept that there is an underlying level of reality, independent of all 
our practices, that explains why anything can “show up” at all within these practices.  
 There is another sense of manifestation, however. We submit that these 
passages should be given a temporal rather than a vertical reading. The relation 
between what can manifest itself and its actual manifestation should be conceived as a 
temporal rather than as a quasi-spatial relation. Let us illustrate this by one of Rouse’s 
own examples, involving the discovery of the hormone TRH within biochemistry. 
Kochan claims to find the same equivocation in Rouse’s language here:  
 
 Once biochemists succeeded in attributing a chemical structure to what 
Rouse also refers to as “the stuff in the fractions,” that stuff was no 
longer an unstable artefact but manifest [sic] itself as a genuine 
“substance” (Rouse 1987, p. 163). Hence, Rouse distinguishes between 
“unstable artefacts” and “stuff,” on the one hand, and “things” and 
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“substances,” on the other, arguing that only the latter can be properly 
recognised as candidates for existence. What he refers to as “the 
complex of practices [… of biochemistry]” comprise the conditions for 
the existence of TRH (Rouse 1987, p. 163). Yet it then becomes rather 
puzzling what the terms “unstable artefact” and “stuff” are meant to 
refer to if not something which exists. It seems more reasonable to say 
that the terms refer to something about which we can say that it is but 
not what it is. (p. 94, italics in original) 
 
First notice that Kochan introduces very awkward distinctions (not at all in line with 
Rouse’s own use of these terms): once we have identified something as an artefact it 
is by definition excluded that it would manifest itself as a genuine substance.5 
Likewise, there is no puzzle about the reference of “artefact”: an artefact denotes a 
stable or unstable phenomenon initially thought to possibly be an entity which turns 
out to be noise – i.e., a negative existence claim contesting the previous positive one. 
It is only “stuff” that can come to manifest itself as substance. But, and this is crucial, 
about this stuff we cannot yet say “that it is” exactly because it is not yet determined 
whether it is referring to a substance or to an artefact (i.e., to something that is not). 
Notice, too, that Kochan does implicitly recognize, in his usage of words like “once” 
and “no longer”, that manifestation can indeed have a temporal dimension; and it 
illustrates how temporal vocabulary prima facie also meets “ordinary norms of 
intelligibility”. 
Whereas Kochan has chosen to focus exclusively on Rouse’s earliest work, it 
is important to stress that part of his later (and still current) work aims to make the 
                                                
5 That this is no accidental lapse on Kochan’s part is shown by the fact that later on, he talks twice 
about “the unstable artefact that would become TRH” (Kochan 2011, p. 106).  
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temporal articulation hinted at here more perspicuous, most notably with respect to 
normativity. With the latter term, Rouse denotes the question of how scientific inquiry 
is accountable to natural phenomena. For the (minimal) realist, it is clear that an 
answer should somehow invoke the brute existence of entities as the crucial 
constraining factor. But for Rouse, normativity is “an essentially temporal 
phenomenon. It amounts to a mutual interactive accountability toward a future that 
encompasses present circumstances within its past” (2007, p. 51). Temporality 
denotes a directedness toward future disclosure that is constrained but not determined 
by the configuration of practices that have emerged from the past (1996, p. 152; 
2002a, p. 176).6 
That said, already in his 1987 book, Rouse’s crucial and Heidegger-inspired 
use of “something being at issue” and “at stake” was present (e.g., p. 67, p. 154). 
Kochan does not take up this temporal vocabulary at all, but paying attention to this 
aspect of Rouse's work allows us to sketch an alternative picture of what is going on 
in the case study discussed. According to this picture (that avoids the admittedly 
maladroit notion of “stuff”), there is no pre-existent thing in the process of being 
stabilised. Yet, there is “something at issue”, focused around what is happening in the 
test tubes and the questions arising from it, which will prospectively turn out to be 
either a (stable or unstable) artefact, or a gradually stabilised entity. We can add that 
in both scenarios, the resolution of the issue deeply affects the future possibilities for 
action and being, which is “what is at stake” in the research – for example, what it 
means to be healthy or sick and, thus, how to deal with both. What our research 
endeavours are about, is what we can now do, say, and contest; how we do that, 
matters for how we ourselves can be.  
                                                
6 For more on temporality, see e.g. 1996, pp. 141, 162, 192; or 2002b, pp. 314, 337, 357. 
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This makes clear that ascriptions of existence (besides those of essence or 
meaning) will often be of paramount importance for the successful continuation of 
research practice. But existence remains an empirical question requiring an empirical 
answer. It is in the practice itself that it will be ascertained, through material-
discursive interactions within a context in which something is at issue. It is the 
concrete differences for our possibilities for action and talk that are introduced by the 
possible existence of the entity in question that affect our understanding of what there 
has always been and will be. There is no extra philosophical question regarding “brute 
existence”. We can empirically ascertain of clouds, bacteria, higgs-bosons, good 
intentions, and economic crises whether they exist, but there is no further property 
that they share for that reason.7  
Thus, on our reading, saying that something manifests itself as something 
existing in a determinate way, is shorthand for the complex temporal process in which 
something which is at issue gets gradually resolved into new possibilities for being, as 
encoded in the ascription of existence (or non-existence) to an entity. And as 
something can only be at issue within the context of some specific (research) 
practices, at no point does this process refer to a level of reality that lies beyond or 
behind all such practices. It only points beyond itself in the temporal sense: that the 
present situation is always intrinsically oriented, or projected, towards the future 
while understood to be rooted in the past. At least prima facie, the latter would seem 
to be more in keeping with the spirit of (or going along “the grain of” (Kochan 2011, 
p. 98)) Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. 
                                                
7 Insofar as we need to invoke entire “theories” of existence (since Rouse himself does not do so), the 
above suggests that Rouse’s position would be much closer to a deflationary theory rather than to a 
redundancy theory. There is room for useful, non-redundant talk about existence: talk that helps 
reconfigure or focus the field of possibilities open for action and being, and that thus allows us to 
express the direction of research. However, this should not be misconstrued as having more ontological 
import than it need have – such talk is not referring to “brute existence”. 
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4. Changing-over existence 
 
This brings us to Kochan’s last complaint. He believes that Rouse can only be saved 
from himself by reconciling him with Heidegger on exactly the one point where he 
explicitly but wrongly distances himself from the latter. And this would have the 
beneficiary effect of challenging Rouse’s status “as the predominant expositor of 
Heidegger’s philosophy of science” (Kochan 2011, p. 83).  
 The point at issue is Rouse’s contestation of Heidegger’s interpretation 
describing science as dealing with entities that are present-at-hand, in contrast to the 
entities ready-to-hand with which we deal in our everyday activities. Kochan wants to 
counter Rouse’s recurring complaint that Heidegger merely asserts that such a 
“change-over” from practical circumspection to theoretical discovery takes place 
without ever adequately describing it (e.g., Rouse 1985, p. 203; Rouse 2005, p. 181; 
more references are provided in Kochan’s footnote 17 on his page 107). To this end, 
he discusses a number of passages where he believes Heidegger does exactly this, 
more specifically the famous discussion on equipmental breakdown in §16 of 
Division 1, and §69 of Division 2. But it is hard to imagine that anyone giving Sein 
und Zeit even only a cursory reading would not realize that these are the passages 
where Heidegger discusses material that is most relevant for the presumed change-
over. Obviously, Rouse would be aware of this. On top of this, Kochan notes that in 
an article of 1981, Rouse stated that “Heidegger has carefully described the various 
possibilities of equipmental breakdown” (Rouse 1981, p. 276; emphasis added by 
Kochan, p. 107, footnote 17); and he adds: “Of course, equipmental breakdown is 
central to the change-over. To the best of my knowledge, Rouse has never 
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acknowledged, much less offered an explanation for, this dramatic and consequential 
shift in his interpretation of Heidegger.” (Ibid.) Wouldn’t it be a much more 
straightforward interpretation to assume that Rouse never went through such dramatic 
conversion, but rather seems to believe that giving an account of equipmental 
breakdown is not at all sufficient for explaining the change-over? 
 That this must indeed be the case becomes clear when we see how Kochan 
does describe the specifics of the change-over. On his reading, equipmental 
breakdown confronts us with the brute existence of things (p. 102), after which 
science provides this brutely existing entity with a modified, scientific essence (p. 
103).8 Kochan attributes Rouse's denial that Heidegger has provided a proper 
description of the change-over to his lack of attention for the multiple meanings that 
“present-at-hand” has for Heidegger (p. 101). But we can turn this diagnosis on its 
head: it is exactly because Rouse sees no place for one of these presumed meanings 
(i.e., brute existence as a property), that he notices a gap in Heidegger’s arguments. 
Equipmental breakdowns occur, and they do confront us with things in their 
unintelligible – because completely decontextualised – present-at-handness. But this 
is merely a limit case of our ordinary meaningful dealings with things: in no way does 
it provide us with a privileged access to their property of brutely existing to which 
science could then attach a modified essence. There is no merely existing entity to 
“remain constant across change-overs in the way it is understood” (p. 109).  
 Rouse’s own alternative consists in the view that science only attaches itself to 
things that matter, i.e., it never ceases dealing with “something with which we are 
involved” and at no point is dealing with “something about which we show our 
                                                
8 This is also explicitly repeated on p. 109: “[E]xistence underpins modifications of essence. Hence, the 
recognition that our understanding of an entity has changed over presupposes the fact of that entity’s 




concern” (Heidegger 1962, p. 200 [158]; quoted in Kochan 2011, p. 103). Or to put it 
in his own terminology: there is always something at stake. Science might never “get 
at the Real” (Kochan 2011, for instance p. 82), but it nevertheless matters profoundly 
for our way of being in the real.  
Of course, if one were to convincingly show that Heidegger does indeed hold 
the meta-philosopical commitment implicitly ascribed to him by Kochan, this would 
fill in the gap exploited by Rouse to offer his alternative view on the relation between 
scientific and everyday practice. But so long as this is merely prejudged, as is the case 
with Kochan’s arguments, then we can return his charge that Rouse is simply begging 
the question against Heidegger (Kochan 2011, p. 107), and claim that Kochan is 
simply begging the question against Rouse in his interpretation of Heidegger.  
 
5. Conclusion: The realism debate and philosophical stances 
 
In the end, it is primarily of historical interest whether Heidegger holds the meta-
philosophical commitment ascribed to him by Kochan. But the difficulties we came 
across in properly interpreting Heidegger do testify to an important characteristic of 
the debates on scientific realism: they have the tendency to bottom out in irresolvable 
positions that are not always easy to articulate. It is not accidental that arguably the 
main protagonist of the debates over the past decades has proposed reconceptualizing 
these positions as philosophical stances rather than more traditionally conceived as 
primarily involving beliefs (van Fraassen, 2002). We have seen that Rouse’s position 
can indeed not be properly understood if one overlooks or misunderstands its 
animating stance. This also implies that his overcoming of the realism debate is no 
Hegelian Aufhebung that would close off the debate once and for all, but rather 
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involves a shifting of our priorities and main valuations as philosophers. In this short 
discussion, we have merely tried to show that this shift can be consistently made. We 
have not attempted to directly defend its value. But it is important to reiterate that it is 
not primarily exegesis that we should be interested in; what really matters is the 
commitments we want to uphold today. It should not be forgotten that Rouse’s 1987 
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